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Quality Assurance Report 
ESO Regulatory and Incentives Arrangements:  
Guidance Document 
 
          6th February 2019 
 
The ESO will be legally separated from the National Grid Plc in April 2019.  This 
change in governance is necessary to reflect  the fast changes in the environment of 
the SO including smaller scale generation, intermittent sources of supply, distributed 
generation, demand side response, storage as well as increases in demand resulting 
from electric vehicles and electrification in transport.  
The ESO should balance the transmission system in the most cost efficient way, by 
removing information asymmetries, promoting competition through encouraging 
participation of existing and new participants into the market in a transparent way. To 
ensure that this happens the ESO needs to operate without any conflict of interests in 
terms of transmission assets infrastructure. Ofgem has decided that this legal 
separation necessitates that the ESO will get its own specific licence. This decision is 
correct. Depending on the experience of the success of the ESO to achieve the roles 
listed above following this separation, it may be needed to further this into an 
ownership separation. 
Along with any modification in the licence resulting from the legal separation it was 
decided to introduce a regulatory and incentives framework that will run for the years 
2018-21 until the RIIO-2 is introduced as a separate price control for the ESO possibly 
incorporating parts of the ESO regulatory scheme in April 2021.  
The addition of the ESO Regulatory and Incentives framework has the purpose of 
incentivising behaviours by the ESO over and above the baseline requirements as 
these are reflected in the licence condition C16. It sets the expectations of the regulator 
of the ESO across its 4 different roles. These are separate and in addition to the 
ongoing RIIO-T1 price control which expires in 2021. While the latter is designed to 
incentivise the ESO to minimise internal costs (with a share of 50% of any overspend 
or underspend to incentivise the ESO to strive for cost efficiencies), the former comes 
with a price tag ± £30 million as a reward or penalty to incentivise spending on these 
principles to achieve performance metrics as set by the ESO in its annual forward plan. 
This creates a conflict but at the same time it is necessary given the dynamic efficiency 
considerations that strongly underline the environment in which the ESO operates at 
a time of rapid changes in technology and the need to respond to them swiftly.1  
                                                          
1 The conflict is not unknown in the 35 years of price controls in the UK with the trade-off between cost efficiency 
and dynamic efficiency. As the firms wish to beat the X as set by the regulator quality increases or the drive to 
innovate may suffer in the search for cost reduction. The separate treatment of capex to that of opex did resolve 
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Regarding the roles and principles framework, Ofgem’s direction of travel is to 
maintain this as part of the next price control. If the ESO believes that this is an 
evolving scorecard system with the principles changing as the expectations of Ofgem 
regarding the ESO change, and that the evolved system will eventually be fed into 
RIIO-2 then it will try to influence its evolution and will behave strategically in its 
reporting in order to achieve this.  
The report by the ESO should have an ongoing progress report character2 for long 
term initiatives elaborating on things like insufficient progress or limited output or 
benefits as these are realised. It is not clear whether these can be contained in 
performance metrics in a scorecard, or they will need to be evaluated in a more 
qualitative way along with some narrative on progress by the ESO (see further on this 
below). 
So there are problems of commitment to the original principles (by the regulator) as 
well as conflicting signals in terms of cost efficiency (as imposed by RIIO versus the 
Reporting and Incentives framework). 
In terms of economic theory, the primary role of the ESO is to maximise information in 
the market to enable participants to minimise transaction costs in self balancing (Role 
1).  The ESO facilitates market clearing through providing information to stakeholders 
in a cost efficient way (the ways to achieve that will require behaviour that overlaps 
with behaviour principles in the other roles). It is easy to measure the performance in 
this role in terms of measurable performance metrics: outage times, accuracy of 
forecasts etc. But this is one of the four roles in the framework. So what happens with 
the other three? 
Before commencing this study the author researched as to whether the scorecard 
approach is used in any other regulated industry. One example was found in Rail. 
ORR has introduced evaluation scorecards for the Network Rail SO (as well as the 
regional routes and the freight segment). The SO scorecard is a 3-tier one3 reporting 
on its own performance (T1), at the directorate level (T2), and at the geographically 
disaggregated route level (T3). It consists of four key areas:  strategic planning, 
managing output changes, managing the sale of access rights framework and 
producing a timetable. The big difference of course is that the rail SO does not have 
any real-time operations. This is in stark contrast with the ESO. Also the majority of its 
operations are easy to measure e.g. producing a timetable easily lends itself to 
performance metrics such “delays due to timetable planning errors”. However, when 
it comes to the role of strategic planning this involves a long term planning process of 
how the network should develop over the long term (30 years hence). Clearly such a 
role is not quantifiable so that a scorecard can be used; the SO is expected to use a 
narrative report.  
                                                          
this dilemma for a time, but at the age of totex combined with an environment of fast and dramatic technological 
changes this has returned.  
2 Ofgem recognises this and makes the point at different points in the related reports. Also there is an example of 
a table in page 29 of the guidance document that provides the opportunity to comment on the delivery of a longer 
aim or activity. 
3 ORR, 2018 Periodic Review Draft Determination, June 2018. 
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The ORR has tried to deal with this long term horizon issue by purposing changes 
involving moving away from route studies undertaken on a rolling basis of 7-10 years 
with a “more modular approach that develops options for funders including to inform 
the enhancement pipeline and upcoming franchise decisions.” (p. 9, ORR report). We 
return to this feature of a more step-wise approach as a solution to long-term projects 
in our discussion below.  
The Ofgem framework sets out four roles for the ESO. These roles largely overlap.  
The regulator has further subdivided into 7 principles in terms of expected behaviour. 
One can view the roles as higher level outcomes, which are then distilled into expected 
behaviour in the form of these principles. In turn these will have to be addressed in 
terms of performance metrics as set by the ESO. 
As mentioned above, in setting these performance metrics, the ESO, like the NR SO, 
has a short run role which is easy to measure and has to do with managing the system 
balance. This can be easily evaluated through performance metrics such as outage 
times, accuracy of forecasting etc.  But this is not the case for the other roles. 
As an example of the overlap in principles, Black Start using distributed generation will 
be evaluated under principle 3, but it belongs to principles 5 and 6 as well.4 
Consequently, there is a danger of double rewarding or, as a risk in the opposite 
direction, splitting the rewards thin across too many principles, or the ESO being 
unsuccessful and facing the risk of being over penalised for this. This also creates a 
danger of the ESO focusing on producing only metrics linked with easy to measure 
behaviours and hence becoming  more short-run focused with damaging implications 
for dynamic efficiency as described below.  
Many of the aspects of the ESO’s remit are long horizon innovation projects. Capturing 
and - equally challengingly - measuring dynamic efficiency is very difficult. This 
requires long term evaluation methods to enable the capturing of actions whose 
benefits may take many years to materialise. There is a clear necessity to introduce 
continuity in the evaluation of long run innovation programmes.   
Possible solution: recognise the different time dimensions in the activities by the ESO 
and introduce a time based three tier scorecard (short run, medium term and long term 
horizon), and reduce the number of principles:   
Role 1 is a short term one (encompassing principles 1 and 2),   for which it is easy to 
have performance metrics for evaluations e.g. accuracy of forecasting (forecasting 
errors), success in balancing (outage times) etc.  Clearly these are subsumed in the 
role of managing the system balancing and operability and depict the success of the 
ESO on minimising information inefficiencies and thus enabling stakeholders to make 
informed decisions driving overall efficiency in balancing.  These belong in the tier 1 
short term scorecard. 
Principles 5-7 should be subsumed into one Role (3) that the ESO can both present 
in its forward plan in a narrative form and include, where possible, performance metrics 
                                                          
4 Black Start is a good example of what is referred to in paragraph 3. 14 as proactive effort by the ESO “…to 
collaborate and cooperate with other stakeholders in order to develop solutions that maximise consumer benefits.” 
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that illustrate progress in the form of milestones.  Equally importantly this will make it 
easier for the Performance Panel to evaluate and assign scores. As these principles 
are measuring long term goals it is expected that the ESO may find it difficult to 
translate into quantifiable performance metrics these type of actions. It may find it 
easier to have a qualitative approach reporting steps and progress into a long term 
project, possibly by separating the actions into milestones as mentioned. These will 
belong in the long horizon tier scorecard.  
Similarly facilitating competitive markets (Role 2) should be seen as a separate 
scorecard for evaluating the actions be the ESO to maximise competition and 
encourage entry into the market by new players as well as existing players. This can 
be the medium term tier scorecard. 
Overall the question is whether it is better to have an evaluation based on four roles 
(or three time related tiers) rather than on seven principles. The latter are helpful as 
guidelines for the ESO of what constitutes behaviour above baseline expectations for 
the regulator, but do not necessarily lend themselves into translating into a scorecard 
system with quantifiable scorecard metrics.  
The performance evaluation criteria to be used by the performance panel require 
evidence of delivered benefits. This will not be easy to quantify in long term initiatives;   
if these are do not materialise for several years, the evidence of future benefits will be 
hard to quantify. This may lead to risk averse behaviour by the ESO who will eschew 
such projects focusing on performance metrics associated with role 1 leading to more 
baseline behaviour rather than “above and beyond” for easier rewards. 
The regulator seems to be wary of exactly the opposite situation: that the ESO will be 
awarded high scores in earlier years on the basis of the future delivery of a long 
horizon initiative and therefore there will be the need to look back and check whether 
the benefits in the performance reports have been realised. While this action is 
sensible it may further reinforce the triggering of risk averse behaviour by the ESO as 
described above and also a risk averse behaviour by the performance panel inducing 
a “wait and see” conservative manner in scoring. Another question is how a continuous 
scorecard that promises to look back at previous plans will translate into the new price 
control. 
As a final thought, the author wishes to consider the menu regulation experience (IQI 
in the regulator’s parlance). IQI is well grounded and justified in economic theory as a 
way to drive both cost efficiency and through incentive compatibility create incentives 
for the company to reveal its true costs. The reason why it has not delivered the 
expected benefits is three fold: the companies try to game the benchmark as the 
information to build this is provided by them, it does not easily translate into the 
companies’ cost structure and, given a loss aversion bias, they are more concerned 
about losses rather than gains.  The fear for the Reporting and Incentive Arrangements 
framework’s efficacy in delivering expected behaviours by the ESO is similar. Will it be 
possible for the ESO to translate this as a company into its corporate cost structure? 
And will the company adopt a risk averse behaviour in reporting and setting its 
performance metrics (to manipulate the evolving expectations of the regulator) and 
respond to incentives in a loss averse way? 
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Answers to questions:  
 
Are there any improvements that could be made to the overall process to ensure 
it is robust, fair and suitable? 
 
The overall process is fair and gives a sense of direction and continuity given the 
frequent contact points before, during and after the setting of the plan, especially in 
terms of engagement with the stakeholders as illustrated in page 10 of the guidance 
document.  Specifically, the ESO needs to engage with stakeholders at least three 
months before publishing its forward plan at the end of March and the regulator can 
respond with an opinion one month later. The company consequently publishes 
performance metrics every month and both the performance panel (PP) and the 
stakeholders have a mid-year review of the ESO performance. The latter gives a clear 
opportunity to update on progress against deliverables as determined by the ESO 
performance metrics, and any consumer benefits created.  
One possible improvement is that the latter consumer benefits should be clearly 
tagged in terms of origination plan clarifying whether such benefits are the results of 
the current year plan, or whether they are the realised benefits resulting from the 
actions from a previous year plan. This will give a clearer picture of the direction of 
progress and improve continuity and robustness in the framework. 
I think that the stakeholder involvement when the ESO sets up its plan and  thereafter 
on the  quarterly performance reports is of critical importance and also can be used 
as evidence of engagement with stakeholders by the PP. It will allow the PP to 
distinguish between plan deliveries of subsequent years. This will increase robustness 
of the overall process on correctly evaluating and rewarding actions by more firmly 
linking them to their outcomes when these are long run ones.  
However, as I have mentioned above, the framework does not necessarily overcome 
issues of biases (e.g. risk aversion and loss aversion) in reporting and in setting the 
performance metrics by the ESO. Similarly it cannot avoid the commonly occurring 
bias of not being always able to detect and punish inaction as in dynamic efficiency it 
is easy to identify and reward realised benefits (as the ESO will strongly pin-point 
them), but it is more difficult to identify forgone benefits and punish for their absence. 
I can offer no remedy to this problem as it is an inherent weakness of the suggested 
process. Moreover, as I mention in page 1 the fact that this is added to the price control 
means that there will be a conflict between cost efficiency and dynamic efficiency.  
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Are there any improvements that could be made to the evaluation criteria in 
particular to ensure that they are robust, fair and suitable for evaluating the 
ESO’s performance? 
 
One improvement, as I have suggested above, is to use as evaluation criteria either 
the four roles or, alternatively, group the seven principles in three, reflecting the short 
term, the medium term and the long term as described in pages 3 and 4. The latter 
makes more sense in terms of the key criteria that the PP is supposed to take into 
account, and in particular (a) and (b)  as well as (d) (p. 19), that have a long term 
character.  The principles are useful as guidance but not as evaluation criteria given 
their overlapping.  Their interpretation is not unambiguous or easy by panel members; 
this means that their suitability is limited and as a result it may reduce robustness and 
consistency in the evaluation process. The regulator does recognise as much in par. 
4.13 (p. 27) by commenting on the crossover between principles.  
Using the roles, rather than the principles, may be more appropriate as they are 
outcomes (rather than expectations of behaviour or outputs), which is more in line with 
the regulatory focus of recent times.  
The use of time dimensions is justified as the ESO scorecard is not for comparison 
purposes with other players in the market, but for comparison of the outcomes 
achieved by the ESO over time. 
What is correct is the use of the stakeholders’ views by the PP to determine under or 
over performance and engagement with the players in the market. Clearly if they 
believe that the ESO has performed above expectations this should constitute strong 
evidence to justify a higher score. At the same the PP will also consider the 
performance metrics although as the regulator suggests they are not in their own right 
“…sufficient evidence to justify performance” (p. 21) unless they are explained by the 
ESO and endorsed by the regulator.  
 
Xeni Dassiou,  
City, University of London  
 
 
 
